Statement by H.E. Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, the Hon'ble Adviser for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Expatriate's Welfare and Overseas Employment

A Proactive Foreign Policy for Bangladesh in Asia; New directions

28 March 2008

The ancient Greeks used to say, with a modicum of logic, as that they were wont to do in an intellectual discourse, that prior to placing your arguments, you must define your terms. A statement on 'foreign policy' should, therefore, must contain what the subject connotes: Tonight I shall, for the purpose of this discussion, take the foreign policy of a country to be the sum-total of its external interactions flowing from a conscious decision to advance the country's perceived national self-interest.

Contemporary literature on foreign policy tends to be either 'process-oriented' with respect to mostly developed industrial states, and 'function-oriented', as with developing or less developed countries. The former concentrates on detailed analyses of foreign-policy-making structures with emphasis on such institutions as bureaucracies, political parties, pressure-groups, and the influence they exert on policy outcomes (Examples of it would be Graham Allison's 'Essence of Decision', Morton Halperin's 'Bureaucratice Politics and Foreign Policy', and William Wallace's, 'Foreign Policy and the Political Process').

As to developing countries, the argument has been made that their institutions, still being rudimentary, deserve less attention than the 'function' of foreign policy. This relates to the purposes they are put to. Their agencies, it has been said, are often small and too inadequate to wield foreign policy influence (some notable proponents of this view are B. Korany in 'Foreign Policy Models and their Empirical Relevance to Third World Actors', E.B. Weinstein in 'The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia', and Maurice East in 'Foreign Policy Making in Small States: Theoretic Observations on Ugandan Foreign Ministry').

You will appreciate that Bangladesh has characteristics that are spread across both spectra. Many of its institution may not be so evolved, and yet she has strong tradition of governance, a vibrant media and civil society, and a political and intellectual heritage that encourages the citizen's interest in public policy. I shall, therefore, take an eclectic approach, one of 'models-mix'. The methodology will be analytical, i.e., it will rely on the preposition that policy rests on multiple determinants including geographical location, historic tradition, national interests, economic and security needs. To these could be added ideological beliefs, religious or nationalistic for instance, and elite-behaviour and perceptions. This is how I shall proceed as I seek to explain and examine why Bangladesh behaves in the international setting as she does, either deliberately or reactively, and how she should shape that behaviour in order to derive maximum benefit from her inter-state interactions.

For Bangladesh, the need for retention of flexibility, and thereby the maintenance of a sufficient of maneuverability to preserve sovereignty was compounded by the urgent need for external support for development. These two aspirations, the quest for serenity and the search for resources, became the twin goals around which foreign policy aims and objectives were developed. They emphasized the felt-need to live in concord with, but distinct from, the powerful neighbour, India. The 'concord' was necessary because geographically Bangladesh was almost 'India-locked'. The distinction was essential because Bangladesh's own identity could only be defined in those terms. Her aspirations, therefore, require Bangladesh to seek a high level of international interactions.

Of the options that a weaker or smaller neighbour may adopt on a regional matrix, one is what the Swedish analyst Erling Bjol has described as 'pilot-fish behaviour', whereby a fish tends to tacks closer to a larger one in order to avoid being eaten. This thesis flowed from his study of Finland's relations with the former Soviet Union. A second option is for the Small State to make herself as difficult as possible for any potential adversary to overcome her, a policy that Prime Minister Erlander espoused for Sweden. A third would be what Myanmar has at times chosen for herself, i.e., dropping out of the international system altogether, a policy-line explained by Ralph Pettman in his 'Small Power Politics'. Bangladesh's preferred policy is more in consonance with the second option, with greater emphasis on political deterrence built by creating a web of international linkages, that would heighten international stakes and interests in her, and reduce the power-gaps with neighbours and other regional actors.

Bangladesh's interactions with others in the international arena led to relations with principally four categories of States (i.e., major development partners, regional countries, China, and West Asia), four international organizations (the UN system, the Commonwealth, the OIC and SAARC) and four trade and financial agencies (the WTO, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Asian Bank and the Islamic Development Bank). These are the twelve pillars that sustain the structure of the totality of Bangladesh's foreign policy system. Not seeing herself as a pre-eminent regional protagonist, Bangladesh wished to be perceived in a peaceable and constructive role in the region, and in the global arenas, evidenced in her active interest in SAARC, and her high level of engagement with the UN including in its peace-keeping operations as one of largest peace-keepers in the world. This attests to the veracity of the statement made by Martin Wright in his famous essay "Power Politics", that the chief objective of smaller powers is the maintenance of greater international order.

The powerful middle class in Bangladesh, reflected in its civil society, contribute to this high level of external interactions. They see themselves as part of a horizontal international elite with a wider role to play in the affairs of the world than is dictated by the objective 'power' of the country. This group or category in society tends to make up for its lower pecking-order in 'power-terms' by emphasizing respect for its 'dignity' through greater international recognition of its capabilities.

A natural corollary of these characteristics is caution and circumspection, through the realization that how the country relates to the world in crucial for its survival. This makes for avoidance of flashy external behaviour. Bangladesh sees her interest generally better served by acting as wider and larger international grouping such as NAM, or OIC, or LDCs. It helps her avoid affronting any key or major player which accepts such behaviour as some kind of international trade union activity. At the same time it satisfies the country's craning for acting from a 'moral high ground' as evidenced in frequent public statements in support of 'principled positions'. (Here as a footnote, let me say that we need to bear in mind Henry Kissinger's warning in his book 'Does America need a Foreign Policy? Towards Diplomacy in the twenty-first Century, that "excessive idealism" could lead to crusades and eventual disillusionment). The consequence of these factors for Bangladesh is the assumption of a lower-profile on 'high risk' issues, and a higher profile on 'low-risk issues'.

As the above analyses will show, the formulation and conduct of Bangladesh Foreign Policy to date has largely been within the framework of a 'classical-paradigm' of normal diplomatic practices. However, the age of 'globalization', which has doubtless raised many challenges has also opened up opportunities that would unlock the potentials to bring home the benefits of a 'pro-active' foreign policy move fully.

The non-technological or the intellectual resources of the Bangladeshis, and their Socratic tradition of relentlessly questioning any given proposition (Amarta Sen's 'The Argumentative Indian' could be more appropriately called the 'The Argumentative Bangalee') have spawned many home-grown ideas and concepts on the socio-political and economic matrix. Examples would be 'Grameen's micro-credit initiatives or BRAC's non-formal education. These have been emulated, adapted, and adopted in many parts of the world. These have also caused at home a massive societal transformation including, for instance, the empowerment of women, that have often also led to strategic partnerships between the government and the civil society. This has helped marginalize extremist thought and action in this country. This has also engendered a deep sense of pluralism in the society, which is be the capital that must be used to build sustainable institutions that is part of the current national endeavour. Resultantly, there is a burgeoning positive image of the country in the international arena, where it is seen as somewhat of an island of a calm in an otherwise turbulent region.

The credit for this should largely go to the common citizen; to the activist who has fought relentlessly for rights; to the journalist who has laboured to discuss the truth; to the peace-keeper who under UN banner has carried the tradition of our fighting men and women to the distant shares of Africa; to the policeman who has helped restore peace in Timor; to the micro-credit manager who has risked his life to introduce these values in the deserts of Afghanistan; to the female garment worker who earned the lion's share in the nations trade-takings; to the expatriate Bangladeshi who works night and day and sends home the much needed remittance; to the entrepreneur who has taken great risks with his small capital in search of innovation, and to the farmer who is labouring painfully to bring food to his family, and to the nation. Today, often amidst a palpable tumult that reflects the vibrancy and energy in the community, Bangladeshis may justly derive some comfort from the prevalent stability.

Globalization should not be a one-way traffic where Bangladeshis remain passively at the receiving end. We can and indeed should make it a two-way traffic, contributing to the phenomenon with what we can, and we can with much. We should be able to provide theoretical frameworks to our field-experiences for consideration of global thought-leaders. This will call for a trickle-up effect of the ideas tried and tested on our own grounds. The IT revolution, and the rapidly growing influence of the civil society world-wide provide us the scope and conduit for that.

We recognize that the soft power of persuasion is the principal implement in our hands, that applies equally to domestic and external relevant actors. It is also true that our external behaviour is shaped by factors that have their origins both externally and internally, or as Professor F.S. Northedge would have said, by those that are both 'systemic' and 'idiosyncratic'.

We believe the way we can best aspire to achieve our twin goals that I spoke of earlier is to pursue a set of coordinated aims in a calibrated fashion. To break up these goals into practical sub-components, or points there are roughly ten. One, stabilizing our relations with our neighbouring countries including India and Myanmar; two, fostering cooperation within multilateral frame workers; three, expanding economic cooperation with developed and other developing countries; four, ensuring duty-free, quota free access for our products into foreign markets, five, exploring new markets for our excess manpower and ensuring their well-being; six, attracting foreign investments; seven, negotiating a favourable trading regime within the WTO, regionally and bilaterally; eight, pursuing an active role within the UN system; nine, supporting peace-keeping and peace-building in conflict and post-conflict zones; and finally, propagating the richness of our cultural heritage abroad so as to heighten interest in us as a civilizing agent in the global arena.

As in Mathematics, or in Physics, the search for balance in the conduct of foreign policy could lead to an equilibrium that would result in inertia. The kinetic energy to effect the necessary thrust forward would only come from the electric impulses generated by intellectual stimuli. We have already seen how concepts like micro-credit and non-formal education are being copied all over the globe. Already many parts of the world are marching to tunes first piped in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh has the potential to stimulate new ideas. This capacity is a major asset for us. Once we had initiated SAARC. Can we not now think of concentric circles of cooperation, beyond SAARC, involving ASEAN, East Asia, China and Japan, into a wider 'ASIAN HOME' to nurture the new 'Asian Century'? For over three and half centuries since the Westphalian state system came into being Europe has ruled the roost. Today the cumulative strains of imperial history has rendered it exhausted. The old does give way to the new. There is now a visible dawning of a new era where Asia will assume a dominant role. Can not Asia organize itself in a way that we move forward in what economists call the paradigm of the "flying geese formation", like a flock rising in the wind, with the weaker ones drawing power and impetus from the flapping of the wings of the stronger ?

At the outset this may seem like a tall order. But it is no taller than many others that Asians have accomplished. Asia's classical heritage provides the fertile grounds; our capacity to think provides the capital; and the trillions of dollars worth of sovereign wealth funds provides the means. History demonstrates that man succeeds when he takes on more complex challenges than he often dares. Has it not been aptly said that man's reach should exceed his grasp what, else are the heavens for ?